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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine your doctor tells you that a procedure involving removal 
of spinal fluid is necessary to diagnose your recurring headaches.  He 
does not tell you—nor do you inquire about—the risks involved in the 
intervention, which include a very small risk of permanent partial 
paralysis.  Unfortunately, paralysis occurs.  American courts have 
established a rule of consent that provides that the physician has an 
affirmative duty to disclose the material risks inherent in the proposed 
therapeutic treatment or surgery.1  Thus, among other claims, you have 
a common law right to recover against the physician for failure to 
provide adequate informed consent. 
Now imagine that, instead of seeking care from your physician, 
you have decided to become a participant in a research protocol that 
is intended to study the cause of recurring headaches.  During the 
process of enrolling you in the study, the investigator does not tell 
you—nor do you inquire about—the risk of permanent partial 
paralysis.  Again, unfortunately, paralysis occurs.  Although the law 
governing human subjects research might lead the investigator to lose 
funding, no equivalent private right of action exists in the research 
context, and thus you are unlikely to be able to seek damages for the 
investigator’s failure to provide adequate informed consent. 
Finally, consider a complicating detail to the latter scenario: the 
investigator, in the course of the study, runs a test on a biological 
sample that he removed during the procedure in order to study a 
hypothetical correlation between the headaches and a certain genetic 
defect.  He discovers, incidentally, that you carry a gene that 
predisposes you to Alzheimer’s Disease.  Although no law requires the 
investigator to tell you this information, there is an emerging general 
consensus that the investigator has an obligation to disclose such 
findings (or at least the possibility of such findings) to you, which could 
also potentially enable you to seek damages where the investigator fails 
to make the appropriate disclosures. 
That a patient who is harmed by her doctor due to lack of 
informed consent has a right to recover is an established tenet of tort 
law.  However, for historic reasons,2 such a right does not extend to a 
research participant3 who is harmed due to a lack of informed consent 
 
 1  See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 2  See infra Part I.A. 
 3  Traditionally, the term “subject” has been used to describe individuals who 
enrolled in research protocols, and the federal regulations (the Common Rule and 
FDA regulations) employ that term.  More recently, commentators have begun to use 
the term “participant” “in order to ‘reinforce the aspiration to involve participants 
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by the investigator in a research protocol.  This distinction between the 
rights of certain individuals to seek remedies directly from those who 
neglected to communicate the risks of an intervention has been the 
subject of extensive literature on the doctrine of informed consent,4 
although courts have generally been either unwilling or unable to 
extend a private right of action to research subjects. 
Significantly, however, the typical research model has evolved 
since the most notable court efforts to find a duty of care, premised on 
a special relationship5 between the investigator and research 
participant.  In contrast to research protocols that required more 
involved medical interventions, protocols that require minimally 
invasive procedures—e.g., a simple blood draw for a genetic test or the 
use of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)—are much more the norm 
today.  Further, with almost daily genetic and medical discoveries, 
there is an ever-increasing possibility of finding out information about 
the research participant that is beyond the scope of the protocol.  
Thus, this Article proposes that the emergence of genetic testing 
technologies, the proliferation of research involving biological 
samples, and the escalating use of medical imaging6 may further 
transform the relationship between the investigator and research 
participant. 
 
more directly in research and its oversight.’”  Carl H. Coleman, Duties to Subjects in 
Clinical Research, 58 VAND. L. REV. 387, 388 n.1 (2005) (citing Comm. on Assessing the 
Sys. for Prot. Human Research Subjects, Inst. of Med., Preserving Public Trust: 
Accreditation and Human Research Participant Protection Programs 34 (2001)).  Because of 
their common and frequent usage, this Article uses the terms “subject” and 
“participant” interchangeably, although each term carries with it particular meaning 
and significance. 
 4  See generally JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND 
CLINICAL PRACTICE (Oxford Univ. Press, 2001); see also generally E. Haavi Morreim, 
Medical Research Litigation and Malpractice Tort Doctrines: Courts on a Learning Curve, 4 
HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 63 (2003); Michelle M. Mello, David M. Studdert & 
Troyen A. Brennan, The Rise of Litigation in Human Subjects Research, 139 ANN. INTERN. 
MED. 40, 40 (2003); Roger L. Jansson, Researcher Liability for Negligence in Human Subject 
Research: Informed Consent and Researcher Malpractice Actions, 78 WASH. L. REV. 229 
(2003); Elizabeth R. Pike, Recovering from Research: a No-Fault Proposal to Compensate 
Injured Research Participants, 38 AM. J. L. & MED. 7 (2012). 
 5  See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001).  
 6  PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, ANTICIPATE AND 
COMMUNICATE: ETHICAL MANAGEMENT OF INCIDENTAL AND SECONDARY FINDINGS IN THE 
CLINICAL, RESEARCH, AND DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER CONTEXTS 39 (Dec. 2013), available at 
http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/FINALAnticipateCommunicate_PCSBI_0.p
df (“Medical imaging—a modality that includes magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), 
computed tomography (CT) scans, X-rays, neuroimaging, and ultrasounds, along with 
techniques such as electroencephalography and electrocardiography that give rise to 
data capable of being represented as images—can lead to incidental and secondary 
findings.”). 
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The right to recover for lack of informed consent is premised on 
the duty that arises out of the relationship between the discloser and 
the disclosee, which is grounded in the principle of autonomy.  In the 
treatment context, when physicians fail to inform their patients about 
the risks of an intervention, patients who are then harmed by the 
undisclosed risks have recourse to a private right of action based in 
common law—a claim based on the failure to provide informed 
consent.7  At its foundation, this recourse is based on the primacy of 
the doctor-patient relationship and arises out of the provider’s duty to 
the patient.  Breach of that duty—through failure to disclose 
information material to the patient’s decision to pursue treatment—
allows the patient to recover damages. 
In contrast, research subjects who are harmed by medical 
research have no such right of action.  The most significant federal 
regulation related to human subjects research, the Common Rule, 
includes no private right of action for participants who are harmed as 
a result of investigators’ failure to disclose the risks of the research; 
instead, the penalty for violation of the regulations is typically loss of 
federal funding or suspension of the research.  The lack of a private 
right of action for research harms is often attributed to the absence of 
a legally recognized relationship between the investigator and the 
participant.  Consequently, this Article focuses on one element of tort 
liability—the duty of care—because of its centrality to the doctrine of 
informed consent and the principle of autonomy that it seeks to 
protect.  Arguments for informed consent in both the treatment and 
research contexts, as well as for disclosure of incidental or secondary 
findings, are premised on the autonomy principle. 
The evolution in the relationship between investigator and 
participant demonstrates the increasing need for a private right of 
action for failure to provide informed consent to research.  Central to 
the contention of this Article, the emerging consensus that 
investigators have some obligation to disclose research findings8 to 
 
 7  BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 258 (“By granting patients access to the courts for 
independent review of their care, society provides a means of compensating patients 
who have suffered harms resulting from negligent practices, and of deterring 
physicians from engaging in such practices.”). 
 8  In attempting to address the definitional confusion that has arisen in 
attempting to determine the extent of a researcher’s obligation to return secondary 
and other research findings, Lisa Eckstein and colleagues have endeavored to suggest 
which definitions and conceptualizations are most appropriate to use in future 
disclosure frameworks.  Lisa Eckstein, Jeremy R. Garrett & Benjamin E. Berkman, A 
Framework for Analyzing the Ethics of Disclosing Genetic Research Findings, 42 J. L. MED. & 
ETHICS 190 (2014).  For purposes of this Article, the authors’ definition of “research 
finding”—”a new piece of information that relates to a particular individual discovered 
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research participants reflects an appropriate response to the changing 
nature of the investigator-research participant relationship, rendering 
it more like the doctor-patient relationship.  The emerging 
expectation that an investigator should disclose (or offer the research 
participant the opportunity to receive) findings that are secondary to 
the research protocol—potentially accompanied by the associated 
private right of action for failure to do so—makes the lack of obligation 
to disclose the primary risks of the research protocol itself (and the lack 
of direct recourse for failure to do so), even more obvious and 
challenging.  Thus, this Article proposes that the ethical duty to 
disclose research findings represents a shift in the relationship 
between the investigator and research participant, which therefore 
supports a private right of action for research participants, who, like 
patients, are harmed by the failure to provide informed consent.  
However, the standard of care for such a private right of action for 
research need not—and probably should not—absolutely mirror the 
standard of care owed to patients in the clinical setting. 
Part I of this Article explores the evolution of, and justification 
for, a private right of action for harms that occur due to failure to 
provide informed consent in the treatment environment but not the 
research setting.  Part II then addresses the evolving research model 
and, in particular, the investigator-participant relationship generally, 
with a focus on the central principle of autonomy.  The Article then 
turns, in Part III, to the subject of returning or disclosing research 
findings in research involving imaging and the testing of genetic and 
biological samples.  Finally, Part IV recommends a modified approach 
to extending the common law claim for lack of informed consent to 
the research setting. 
  I.  A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR TREATMENT BUT NOT RESEARCH 
A.  Informed Consent to Treatment 
To understand the common law right of action for failure to 
provide informed consent to treatment, one must look to its history.  
In most states, this negligence-based tort stands in contrast to the 
intentional tort of battery.9  The prototypical battery case involves 
 
by virtue of research procedures”—is a particularly useful “catchall” for the incidental 
and secondary findings discussed here.  Id. at 200. 
 9  Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229 (1972); Kennis v. Mercy Hosp. Med. Ctr., 491 
N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1992); Mole v. Jutton, 846 A.2d 1035 (Md. Ct. App. 2004); Howard 
v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73 (2002); Jaskoviak v. Gruver, 638 
N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 2002); Messina v. Matarasso, 284 A.D.2d 32 (N.Y.A.D. 2001); 
Blanchard v. Kellum, 975 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1998).  But see Montgomery v. Bazaz-
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intentional unauthorized physical contact with a patient where the 
contact causes harm.10  However, a patient can recover for battery even 
if she is not harmed, if the physician performs the intervention without 
the patient’s knowledge or agreement.11  Importantly, battery “assumes 
that important medical decisions are implemented through actual 
physical touching.”12  Today, battery is invoked at a less frequent rate 
than it was historically,13 perhaps because treatment is often conducted 
with less physical touching due to the increasing use of noninvasive 
tests and procedures. 
Over the course of the twentieth century, the medical profession 
shifted from a patriarchal system—in which the doctor held all the 
information and yielded all decision-making power within the doctor-
patient relationship—to a more “patient-centered approach to health 
care,”14 based on the ascension of the principle of patient autonomy 
within the doctor-patient relationship.  Early references to the 
emerging doctrine of informed consent appeared toward the 
beginning of the twentieth century.  In the seminal decision 
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, which revolved around 
 
Sehgal, 568 Pa. 574 (2002) (treating both no consent and lack of informed consent as 
battery claims).  See also DOBBS’ LAW OF TORTS, § 308 (2d ed. West 2014) (“The 
negligence in the informed consent claim is not negligence in performing a medical 
procedure, but rather negligence in failing to explain its risks, alternatives, and other 
related information.”). 
 10  DOBBS’ LAW OF TORTS, § 33 (2d ed. West 2014). 
 11  Id. 
 12  Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected 
Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 229 (1985).  
 13  Jerry Menikoff, LAW AND BIOETHICS 156 (2001) (“[T]he tort of battery plays a 
relatively minor role in modern doctor-patient relations.”).  In INFORMED CONSENT: 
LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 136 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2001), supra note 4, 
Jessica W. Berg et al. state: 
By the mid-1970s, almost all states that had considered the question had 
concluded that inadequate disclosure is actionable only as professional 
negligence, not battery. . . .  At the same time, the administration of 
therapy without any consent at all, or outside the scope of the consent 
given, is still actionable as a battery in many states.   
Mark A. Rothstein & Gil Siegel, Health Information Technology and Physicians’ Duty to 
Notify Patients of New Medical Developments, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 93, 121 (2012). 
 14  Felicity Goodyear-Smith & Stephen Buetow, Power Issues in the Doctor-Patient 
Relationship, 9 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 449, 450 (2001).  See also JAY KATZ, THE SILENT 
WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984); DAVID ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: 
A HISTORY OF HOW LAW AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISIONMAKING (1991) 
(noting the increasing social distance between patients and physicians).  But see Ezekiel 
J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Four Models of the Physician-Patient Relationship, in 
READINGS IN HEALTH CARE ETHICS 12 (2002) (“Over the last few decades, the discourse 
regarding the physician-patient relationship has focused on two extremes: autonomy 
and paternalism.  Many have attacked physicians as paternalistic urging the 
empowerment of patients to control their own care.”). 
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allegations of unauthorized surgery during a routine examination, 
Justice Cardozo stated, “[e]very human being of adult years and sound 
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; 
and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s 
consent commits an assault, for which he is liable for damages.”15  
Although this language appears to establish the right of informed 
consent to treatment, the controversy in Schloendorff was not about the 
nature or amount of information the physician communicated to the 
patient as part of the patient’s consent to treatment.  Instead, the case 
was based on the patient’s explicit refusal to consent to a specific 
surgical procedure.16  Regardless, Justice Cardozo’s famous words 
represent the principal limitation on the physician-patient 
relationship. 
The doctrine of informed consent developed via the common law 
under the rubric of negligence law, beginning in the 1950’s,17 and an 
affirmative duty to disclose was first addressed in the courts in 1957.18  
Particularly in the 1960’s and 1970’s, patients began asserting 
increasing self-determination in their medical decision-making; this 
shift away from medical paternalism and toward patient-driven 
medicine has been described as “the historical transition from the 
regime of ‘doctor is right’ to ‘patient has rights.’”19  Patient 
 
 15  105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).  
 16  Id.; Menikoff, supra note 13, at 156.  Thus, “[w]hen Cardozo talks about 
performing an operation ‘without consent,’ he is not referring to a failure to 
adequately explain the risks and benefits of the procedure.  Rather, battery takes place 
only when something happens to a patient other than what the patient expected.”  Id.  
In Medical Research Litigation and Malpractice Tort Doctrines, supra note 4, at 63, E. Haavi 
Morreim writes: 
For research undertaken during the current era of federal supervision 
and mandatory informed consent, the most prevalent complaints 
concern inadequate, not absent, information.  If battery applies to a 
complete failure to disclose, breach of informed consent would apply 
when a researcher has openly invited someone to enter a research 
protocol but insufficiently described its nature, uncertainties, risks or 
alternatives. 
 17  Menikoff, supra note 13, at 157. 
 18  Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) 
(holding that physicians had a duty to disclose all facts that were necessary for the 
patient to make an intelligent health care decision).  Commentators have noted that 
the law’s focus on “psychic integrity has existed for almost as long [as the law’s concern 
for bodily integrity] and has received increasing support in this century as evidenced 
by the cases recognizing causes of action in tort law for intentional, and more recently, 
negligent infliction of emotional distress.”  BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 43. 
 19  Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Law of Informed Consent: From “Doctor is Right” to “Patient 
has Rights,” 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243 (2000).  See also Azgad Gold, Physicians’ “Rights of 
Conscience”–Beyond Politics, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 134, 135 (2010) (“[The doctor-patient 
relationship] has changed significantly as a direct result from the rise of the informed 
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empowerment means the ability to make fully informed decisions, 
based on adequate information furnished by one’s physician, rather 
than relying on one’s physician to know and decide what is best for the 
patient.20  Because “courts were far more reluctant to characterize as 
batteries treatments or operations that were performed with the 
patient’s consent but without an adequate disclosure by the surgeon of 
the risks, benefits, and alternatives to the agreed upon procedure,”21 
they turned to the doctrine of informed consent to remedy such 
harms.22 
As a result, in order to ensure that the patient receives sufficient 
information with which to make a decision to undergo a specific 
treatment, courts turned to a negligence theory premised on the 
doctrine of informed consent.23  Under this cause of action, failure to 
disclose the risks of an intervention may allow an individual to recover 
for harm arising from nondisclosure of information material to the 
individual’s decision to agree to the intervention.  In other words, a 
patient may claim lack of informed consent when she consented to the 
intervention itself but disclosure of the risks was insufficient.  Thus, by 
allowing patients to recover for lack of informed consent—rather than 
just consent—courts have attempted to fill an important gap.24 
Today, all United States jurisdictions have adopted some form of 
the doctrine of informed consent either by statutory enactment or 
judicial decision.25  Until 1972, the question of the legal adequacy of a 
 
consent doctrine whose goals were the ‘protection of patient or subject welfare and 
the promotion of autonomy.’”).  Gold identifies the legal transition to the doctor-
patient relationship in the past four decades, in which “the informed consent process 
was established as a legal standard of care which enabled the patient to act as an 
autonomous ‘persona,’ according to her own wishes and values.”  Id.  See also Leonard 
J. Long, Can Health Care Conscientious Objectors Thread the Needle?, 13 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH 
L.J. 51, 67–68 (2009). 
 20  Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 
313, 318 (2002).  
 21  Id. at 319. 
 22  Although it is true that patients now have much more access to information “on 
the Internet, commercials, and television medical dramas,” concern still exists about 
the quality of this information.  Long, supra note 19, at 67–68.  Thus, information 
furnished from one’s own physician is likely to be the most accurate, personal, and 
reliable. 
 23  BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 134. 
 24  The court in Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging, Ltd., 70 P.3d 435, 439 (Ariz. 
2003) addressed the distinction between lack of “consent” and lack of “informed 
consent,” noting that “‘lack of informed consent,’ . . . should be pled in negligence, 
and ‘lack of consent,’ should be pled in battery.”  See also Menikoff, supra note 13, at 
156–57. 
 25  BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 42–43.  Most informed consent statutes were 
enacted after 1975.  In general, jurisdictions where the doctrine of informed consent 
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patient’s consent to medical treatment was most often raised when 
there were allegations that the consent was vitiated by the kind of 
medical treatment provided.  Consent was invalid if a patient was not 
told that the procedure consented to was radically experimental or if 
the common presumptions of patient and physician were contradicted 
by the facts.26  Thus, before 1972, consent was generally legally 
adequate as long as the patient had notice of the nature and scope of 
the proposed medical intervention: what the physician proposed and 
its probable result.  The change was first announced in the cases 
Canterbury v. Spence27 and Cobbs v. Grant,28 in which both courts imposed 
a duty on the physician to tell the patient of the potential risks and 
benefits of the proposed treatment, the potential risks and benefits of 
alternative treatments, and the risks involved in refusing any treatment 
at all.29  The purposes behind the doctrine of informed consent are 
several, and include protection of individual autonomy and dignity, 
avoidance of patient fraud or duress, encouragement of physicians to 
make good decisions, enablement of patient rational decision-making, 
and involvement of the public in medicine, via a policy of shared 
decision-making. 
A claim of lack of informed consent requires the same elements 
required to establish a traditional negligence claim: (1) a duty of care 
owed by the defendant to use reasonable care to prevent harm to the 
plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, (3) harm or injury to the plaintiff, 
and (4) a causal link between the injury and the breach of duty.30  At 
the heart of this Article is the first element: the duty owed to the 
individual who is harmed due to the physical intervention.  The 
traditional negligence requirements include an established physician-
patient relationship, which imposes a physician duty of care.  Such a 
relationship is sometimes characterized as a contractual one31 in which 
 
has been introduced by common law decision have more extensive requirements 
concerning patient information and participation. 
 26  Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 27  Id. 
 28  8 Cal. 3d 229 (1972) (holding that a physician is under a duty to disclose to a 
patient those risks and benefits of the proposed treatment, alternative treatments, and 
of no treatment, which a hypothetical reasonable patient would consider material).   
 29  BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 136–37. 
 30  BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 133–34; Diane E. Hoffmann & Karen H. 
Rothenberg, Whose Duty Is It Anyway?: The Kennedy Krieger Opinion and Its Implications for 
Public Health Research, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 109 (2002); but see Susan M. Wolf, 
Jordan Paradise & Charlisse Caga-Anan, The Law of Incidental Findings in Human Subjects 
Research: Establishing Researchers’ Duties, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 361 (2008). 
 31  Richard Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1 AM. BAR FOUND. J. 
87, 127 (1976) (“The root problem with the informed consent doctrine is that it is 
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the patient knowingly and voluntarily seeks the professional assistance 
of the physician, thereby initiating the relationship, and the physician 
knowingly agrees to treat the patient.32  The physician’s goal in the 
relationship is to benefit the patient, either through treatment or 
preventative care.  To demonstrate the existence of a doctor-patient 
relationship, courts typically require: (1) a direct connection between 
the doctor and patient, (2) that the patient sought care from the 
doctor, (3) the doctor’s consent to render advice, and (4) the patient’s 
reliance on the doctor’s care.33  A patient may not recover for lack of 
informed consent for nondisclosure of the risks of a proposed 
treatment if there is no doctor-patient relationship.  The doctor-
patient relationship is essential to a claim for failure to provide 
informed consent because of the inherent information disparity: the 
patient lacks the professional knowledge of the physician and is the 
one at risk of injury, illness, and death.34  The professional can inform 
or advise the patient about the medical risks and benefits of an 
intervention. 
Under the doctrine of informed consent, the physician must 
disclose the risks of the intervention and obtain consent before 
initiating treatment.35  Thus, it focuses primarily on the duty of the 
physician to disclose information to the patient, and secondarily on the 
patient’s consent.  An individual claiming lack of informed consent 
must demonstrate that the physician failed to disclose information 
material to his or her decision to consent to a particular intervention.  
Only half of American jurisdictions accept the core principle 
enunciated in Canterbury v. Spence that the patient’s need for 
information to effectuate self-determination requires a standard of 
disclosure established by law (the reasonable patient standard), rather 
than professional custom (what a reasonable physician concludes a 
 
forever at war with the mutual expectations of the parties.”).   
 32  Kelley v. Middle Tenn. Emerg. Physicians, P.C., 133 S.W.3d 587, 593 (Tenn. 
2004); Mead v. Legacy Health Sys., 352 Or. 267 (2012); Green v. Walker, 910 F.2d 291, 
293 (5th Cir. 1990).  See also M Shultz, supra note 12, at 223–24 (1985).  This 
contractual relationship may either be express or implied.  Similarly, it has been held 
that a consent form in a research protocol formed a unilateral contract.  See Dahl v. 
Hem Pharmaceuticals Corp., 7 F.3d 1399 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 33  See, e.g., Betesh v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1974); Kundert v. Il. 
Valley Comm. Hosp., 964 N.E. 2d 670 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); Reynolds v. Decatur Mem. 
Hosp., 277 Ill. App. 3d 80 (1996) (holding that there was no physician-patient 
relationship between a doctor who gave an informal opinion over the telephone at the 
request of the treating physician and a minor patient whose case was discussed, and 
thus the doctor did not owe duty of care to patient). 
 34  See generally Betesh v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1974). 
 35  BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 141. 
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patient ought to know).36  In other words, half of the states use the 
“reasonable patient” standard of Canterbury,37 while half use 
“professional” standard (like that employed in other medical 
malpractice cases). 
Decisions addressing informed consent arising in the treatment 
context have also been premised on the physician’s fiduciary duty to 
her patient.38  A fiduciary duty claim, or one that is based on an 
individual’s obligation to act for another’s benefit, requires that the 
patient show that (1) had he known of a certain risk, he would have 
behaved different; and (2) another approach would have resulted in a 
different outcome.  However, generally, “the standard physician-
patient relationship is not always deemed fiduciary in the most classic 
sense.”39 
B.  Informed Consent to Research 
Unsurprisingly, the focus on the doctrine of informed consent 
came to the forefront in the research context at the same time as it did 
in the treatment context.  However, research participants who are 
harmed in the course of medical research rarely have a right to recover 
for lack of informed consent.  The law as it relates to the failure of 
investigators to disclose risks in the research context developed 
statutorily, rather than judicially.40  This fundamental distinction in the 
doctrine of informed consent between treatment and research is 
central to the absence of judicial recourse for research participants 
who are harmed as a result of investigators’ failure to disclose the risks 
of research. 
The modern history of human subjects research can be traced 
back to the Nazi experiments during World War II and the Nuremberg 
War Crimes Trials against twenty-three doctors who had performed 
medical experiments without the subjects’—prisoners of war and 
 
 36  David M. Studdert et al., Geographic Variation in Informed Consent Law: Two 
Standards for Disclosure of Treatment Risk, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 103 (2007). 
 37  Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 38  Shea v. Esenstein, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).  However, in Neade v. Portes, 193 
Ill. 2d 433 (2000), the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the use of fiduciary theories to 
protect patients from risks created by provider’s third party financial arrangements, 
like managed care organizations. 
 39  Morreim, supra note 4, at 4 (citing J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 29 
(1981) (discussing the historical shift away from holding doctor-patient relationship 
to be fiduciary because of the doctor’s superior education)). 
 40  BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 258 (“The very fact that consent to treatment has 
been left to judicial control, while consent to research is regulated by administrative 
bodies, points to a fundamental distinctions between the treatment and research 
processes.”).   
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civilians of occupied countries—consent.  The resulting 1947 
Nuremberg Code, authored by the expert witnesses and judges in the 
“Doctors Trial,” is a set of research ethics principles for human 
experimentation and emphasizes the principles of autonomy and 
respect for persons.41  However, since then, the U.S. has had its own 
major research scandals.  In one of the most notorious studies, United 
States Public Health Service researchers investigating the progression 
of syphilis failed to treat participants or inform them of available 
treatments, even after penicillin became widely available for 
treatment.42  From 1932 to 1972, nearly 400 impoverished African 
Americans were included in the study, many of whom died of syphilis 
or syphilis-related conditions.  The experiment, which became known 
as the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, persists as an infamous example of non-
consensual, harmful research.43 
In light of the revelation of scandals such as the Tuskegee Syphilis 
study and those revealed by Henry Beecher’s groundbreaking 1966 
article in the New England Journal of Medicine,44 lawmakers at both 
the federal and state levels have attempted to create oversight 
mechanisms for human subjects research, with the goal of protecting 
the rights of participants from harmful, unethical research.  These laws 
and regulations focus on voluntary informed consent and oversight to 
protect research participants from abuse.  In 1974, Congress passed 
the National Research Act, which created the National Commission for 
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
 
 41  See Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control 
Council Law No. 10 (1949) available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/ 
nurcode.html. 
 42  Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee, Final Report of the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study Legacy Committee – May 20, 1996, http://exhibits.hsl.virginia.edu/badblood/ 
report/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2014). 
 43  Id. 
 44  Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J. MED. 367, 371 
(1966), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/documents/BeecherArticle.pdf.  In one 
example, the Willowbrook State School, a New York residential institution for 
developmentally disabled persons, asked parents to give “consent” for the deliberate 
infection of their children with hepatitis, although the risks to the children were not 
disclosed.  Some of the children were then treated with immunoglobulins in an 
attempt to diminish the effect of the disease, while others served as control subjects.  
In some cases, children waiting for admission to the institution gained entry when 
parents agreed to enroll their child in the study since the only available rooms were in 
the experimental ward.  In another instance cited in the article, researchers from 
Memorial Sloan-Kettering injected cancer cells into twenty-two institutionalized 
elderly patients at the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital.  Patients were not informed 
that they were exposed to cancer but were told only that they would receive “some 
cells.”  Id. at 371. 
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Research (“National Commission”).45  One of the responsibilities of the 
National Commission was to identify the ethical principles that should 
be the foundation of human subjects research and to develop 
guidelines to assure that such research is conducted in accordance 
with those principles. 
The National Commission’s 1978 report, also known as the 
Belmont Report, enunciated three ethical values by which research 
involving human subjects should be conducted: respect for persons, 
beneficence, and justice.46  The first of these values, respect for 
persons, addresses the primary ethical imperative that individuals 
should be respected as autonomous agents.47  An autonomous 
individual can consider and act upon personal goals, and to respect an 
autonomous individual is to accept his opinions and decisions—so 
long as these actions do not harm others.  The value of respect for 
persons encourages potential participants to be involved in the 
decision-making process, assuring them that they have an essential role 
in the research and that their opinions and decisions are valued.  It 
also reminds investigators that all participants should be treated with 
dignity and respect, and that they are not merely objects to be used for 
the purpose of research. 
In turn, the Belmont Report became the basis for much of the 
federal Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
regulations, including the Common Rule, which now govern the 
majority of human subjects research in the country.48  With its focus on 
 
 45  THE NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT (1979), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ 
ohrp/policy/belmont.html. 
 46  Id. 
 47  The original Belmont Report detailed the value of autonomy thusly: 
An autonomous person is an individual capable of deliberation about 
personal goals and of acting under the direction of such deliberation.  
To respect autonomy is to give weight to an autonomous person’s 
considered opinions and choices while refraining from obstructing their 
actions unless they are clearly detrimental to others.  To show lack of 
respect for an autonomous agent is to repudiate that person’s 
considered judgments or to withhold information necessary to make a 
considered judgment, when there are no compelling reasons to do so. 
Id. 
 48  45 C.F.R 46 (Subpart A) (2014).  The Common Rule (formally “The Federal 
Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects”) has been adopted by eighteen federal 
government agencies to promote uniformity in the conduct of human subjects 
research.  Research is primarily overseen by the Office of Human Research Protections 
(OHRP), an office within HHS, which ensures regulatory compliance and provides 
guidance for the conduct of such research.  See generally US Department of Health and 
Human Services, OHRP Fact Sheet – December, 2009, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/about/ 
facts/index.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2014).  Only Subpart A of 45 C.F.R. 46 (2014), 
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beneficence, justice, and—most important to this discussion—
autonomy, the Common Rule applies to research that uses federal 
funds, is conducted by the federal government, or is overseen by a 
federal agency.49  The Common Rule and similar FDA regulations50 are 
intended to protect research participants by minimizing the possibility 
of coercion or undue influence by laying out the requirements for 
informed consent.  Among its other elements, the Common Rule 
enunciates detailed requirements regarding institutions’ 
responsibilities to assess research protocols and for obtaining and 
documenting informed consent, including disclosure of potential risks 
and benefits.51 
However, neither the Common Rule nor the FDA regulations—
the most significant federal regulations related to human subjects 
research—provide a private right of action for participants who are 
harmed as a result of investigators’ failure to disclose the risks of the 
research.  The lack of a private right of action for research harms can 
be attributed to the absence of a recognized relationship between the 
investigator and the participant.  In the treatment context, the doctor-
patient relationship gives rise to a duty of the physician to the patient; 
breach of that duty allows the injured patient to recover for damages 
in civil suit.52  Because a similar relationship does not exist between the 
investigator and research participant, a researcher’s duty of informed 
consent to study participants is limited.  Instead, in the absence of a 
therapeutic relationship, the penalty for violation of the regulations 
governing human subjects research is loss of federal funding or 
suspension of research.53 
Historically, the relationship between the investigator and 
research participant has been easily distinguishable from the 
relationship between the doctor and patient.  For one, to the extent 
that the doctor-patient relationship is a fiduciary one, the investigator-
 
the Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, is identified as the 
Common Rule.  The Common Rule is also consistent with the Declaration of Helsinki 
(recommendations by the World Medical Association (WMA) for research involving 
human subjects).  The Declaration of Helsinki was originally adopted by the WMA in 
1964, and the most recent amendments were adopted in October 2013. 
 49  45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2014). 
 50  21 C.F.R. § 50 (2014).  The FDA regulations are substantially similar to the 
Common Rule. 
 51  45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116–17 (2014). 
 52  See supra Section I.0. 
 53  Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), Department of Health and 
Human Services, OHRP’s Compliance Oversight Procedures for Evaluating Institutions (Oct. 
14, 2009), available at http:// www.hhs.gov/ohrp/compliance/ohrpcomp.pdf; 45 
C.F.R. § 46.123(a) (2014); 21 C.F.R. § 56.121 (2014). 
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research participant relationship is not.54  In the treatment context, a 
physician has a direct obligation to provide care to the patient, with 
the purpose of preserving or improving her health.  This purpose lends 
itself to an expectation of trust and confidence upon which a fiduciary 
relationship may be based.  In contrast, the investigator’s interaction 
with a study’s participant is for the advancement of generalized 
knowledge—and not the direct (or even often indirect) benefit to the 
research participant.55 Thus, “a completely different allegiance 
permeates the relationship.  The investigator’s entire purpose, his 
number one loyalty, is already pegged on something other than the 
patient.  It is to the protocol.”56 
Although lawsuits based on failure of informed consent against 
investigators have increased in the last few decades,57 those courts that 
 
 54  Morreim, Medical Research Litigation and Malpractice Tort Doctrines, supra note 4, 
at 45; Elizabeth R. Pike, Karen Rothenberg & Benjamin E. Berkman, Finding Fault?: 
Exploring Legal Duties to Return Incidental Findings in Genomic Research. 102 GEO. L.J. 795, 
818 (2014) (“But researchers qua researchers are not generally thought to owe 
fiduciary duties, despite often having similar knowledge, skills, and abilities . . . .  
Researchers, therefore, owe participants something less than a fiduciary duty.”). 
 55  Coleman, supra note 3; BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 281; Matthew Gordon, A 
Legal Duty to Disclose Individual Research Findings To Research Subjects?, 64 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 225 (2009).  Gordon notes that the traditional approach is beginning to break 
down: “The traditional rule regarding third-party examinations is changing, however, 
and with it the implications for researchers’ disclosure duties to their subjects. In a 
number of jurisdictions, courts have been unwilling to rigidly apply the formal 
requirements of a physician-patient relationship when faced with preventable harm.”  
Id. at 238.  See also Morreim, supra note 4, at 45. 
 56  Morreim, supra note 4, at 45.  See also PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF 
BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 6, at 91 (“Whereas clinicians have strong fiduciary duties 
to act in the best interests of patients, researchers have obligations to their participants 
and to society.  Both society at large and participants engaged in research have a vested 
interest in completed research that furthers scientific knowledge.”); Pike, supra note 
4, at 12 ([T]rust and dependency are “not the cornerstone of the researcher-
participant relationship.”). 
 57  See, e.g., Mello, Studdert & Brennan, supra note 4, at 40; Morreim, supra note 4, 
at 4; Alice Dembner, Lawsuits Target Medical Research—Patient Safeguards, Oversight Key 
Issues, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 12, 2002, at A1.  The case of Jesse Gelsinger exemplifies 
what some commentators have noted to be a proliferation of (often unsuccessful) tort 
litigation against researchers.  An eighteen-year old volunteer with ornithine 
transcarbamylase deficiency died during his participation in a gene transfer study at 
the University of Pennsylvania.  The lawsuit brought by his father against the university 
and investigators alleged that the investigators committed fraud by not revealing that 
a co-investigator, the university, and other university officials had financial 
relationships with Genovo, a biotechnology company, and stood to gain financially 
from the successful use of RDAd vectors.  Complaint, Gelsinger v. Trustees of the Univ. 
of Pa. (2000), http://www.sskrplaw.com/files/gelsinger_complaint.pdf.  The 
complaint also alleged that the investigators had failed to inform Jesse of the risks of 
the study, that they had failed to inform Jesse or the FDA of adverse events experienced 
by other participants in the same trial as well as the death of monkeys in an earlier 
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have attempted to establish a private cause of action for failure to 
provide informed consent in research have rarely—if ever—been 
successful.58  Because of the absence of a duty of care premised on a 
recognized relationship between investigators and research 
participants in the current rules governing human subjects research, 
courts are generally reluctant to recognize a duty-conferring 
relationship between the investigator and research participant.59  In 
most instances where courts have found a duty-conferring relationship 
in the research context, they have done so based on a preexisting 
doctor-patient interaction, such that the physician serves a dual role 
(as does the patient).  For example, in Darke v. Isner, the Massachusetts 
Superior Court held that the state common law was broad enough to 
impose tort liability on a doctor who failed to disclose his financial 
interest in the treatment he recommended.60  Roger Darke, a 
participant in an experimental gene therapy program conducted by 
Dr. Jeffrey Isner, chief of cardiovascular research at St. Elizabeth’s 
Medical Center in Boston, died twenty-four hours after undergoing 
surgery in which Isner administered a gene therapy.61  Darke’s widow 
sued the hospital and doctors, alleging that, had Darke known that a 
previous patient had died in the program and that Isner had financial 
interests in the success of the gene therapy program, Darke would not 
 
animal study, and that the investigators had allowed Jesse to participate in the study 
despite not meeting its inclusion criteria due to the fact that his liver was not 
functioning within the study’s 24-hour limit.  Jesse Gelsinger’s father learned that a 
“principal investigator, James Wilson, owned stock in . . . [the] company [he had] 
founded, which contributed $4 million per year to human gene therapy research at 
the University . . . where the experiment took place,” and claimed that had Gelsinger 
known about these financial interests, “he would not have [participated] in the 
research study.”  David Resnik, Disclosing Conflicts of Interest to Research Subjects: An Ethical 
and Legal Analysis, 11 ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESEARCH 141, 142 (2004).  The suit ended in 
a confidential settlement in 2000. 
 58  Federal courts have generally rejected a private right of action.  See Robertson 
v. McGee, 2002 WL 535045, at *3 (N.D. Okla. 2002); Robinett v. U.S., 62 F.3d 1433, at 
1 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Washington v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1000 (E.D. M.O. 
2006).  A Pennsylvania court has found that a hospital could be held liable for failure 
to obtain informed consent in experimental studies pursuant to FDA regulations.  
Friter v. Iolab Corp., 414 Pa. Super. 622 (1992).  The court, however, appears to 
conflate the patient’s and the research participant’s rights to informed consent, noting 
that the plaintiff had been a patient of the hospital and “was never informed, prior to 
surgery, that he was about to become a participant in a clinical investigation.”  Id. at 
624.  The court held that the unconsented-to operation was a non-consensual 
touching, “thus giving rise to an action for a ‘technical’ battery.”  Id. at 627. 
 59  Wolf, Paradise & Caga-anan, supra note 30, at 368 (citing Wright v. Fred 
Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (W.D. Wa. 2002)). 
 60  Darke v. Isner, 20 Mass. L. Rep. 419 (Mass Super. Ct. 2005). 
 61  Id.  
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have participated.62  At the time the suit was filed, Isner and his heirs 
owned 20 percent of Vascular Genetics, which Isner helped found in 
1997 to support the experimental gene therapy treatment for coronary 
artery disease that he developed (the defendant hospital also owned 
20 percent).  The complaint alleged that Darke “was intentionally and 
maliciously treated as a human guinea pig in order to generate great 
financial profits for all defendants.”63 
The trial court held that the doctor and hospital could be held 
liable for failing to disclose, as part of the informed consent process, 
their financial interests in the treatment that they recommended.64  
The court repeatedly refers to Isner as Darke’s “doctor” and relies on 
the reasoning that supports the duty of care (and the associated duty 
to disclose financial conflicts of interest) based on a medical physician-
patient relationship.65  Again, the next year, the same court held that 
enough evidence had been presented to support the allegation that 
the doctor’s financial stake in the success of the gene therapy 
treatment may have compromised how the clinical trial was conducted, 
and that enough evidence was presented to demonstrate the existence 
of a doctor-patient relationship between Darke and Isner.66  It also held 
that the hospital and doctor failed to disclose the financial 
relationships to Darke and his wife.  Despite all of this, the jury 
ultimately found for the defendants. 
Courts have also generally refused to find that the federal rules 
and regulations governing informed consent in research give rise to a 
private right of action for research participants.  For example, in Wright 
v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, family members of cancer 
patients who had participated in a clinical trial sued the Fred 
Hutchinson Cancer Research Center (the Hutch) and its investigators 
in an attempt to enforce the Common Rule, Nuremberg Code, and 
Declaration of Helsinki.67  The clinical trial tested use of a monoclonal 
antibody to reduce the risk of graft-versus-host disease in bone marrow 
transplant recipients.  The antibody caused graft rejections, cancer 
 
 62  Complaint, Darke v. Isner, No. 02-2194-E (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2002). 
 63  Id.   
 64  Darke v. Isner, 17 Mass.L. Rep. 689 (Mass Super. Ct. 2004). 
 65  The court only once refers to “research,” in relying on “various guidelines 
promulgated by professional medical organizations as well as by the federal 
government” to support a requirement of consent forms in research.  However, the 
court continues to inappropriately conflate treatment and research, explaining that 
these guidelines and the Common Rule “indicate a trend towards requiring physicians 
to disclose non-medical information to the patient.”  Id. 
 66  Darke v. Isner, 20 Mass. L. Rep. 419 (Mass Super. Ct. 2005). 
 67  269 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (W.D. Wash. 2002). 
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relapses, and new cancers, which the plaintiffs alleged caused 
premature death in some trial participants.  The Seattle Times exposed 
that the Hutch had licensed the commercial rights to the antibody 
being studied to a start-up company called Genetic Systems but 
retained a royalty interest and held stock in the company.68  In 
addition, one of the investigators had a seat on the Genetic Systems’ 
scientific advisory board, another was employed as the company’s 
medical director in addition to working for the Hutch, and the third 
was a consultant to the company.  The plaintiffs claimed that the 
defendants failed to disclose the risks of trial participation and the 
financial interests of the Hutch and investigators involved in the study 
violated the rights of trial participants.  The trial court disagreed, 
holding that withholding information did not violate the trial 
participants’ rights.69  It also rejected a claim brought under the Civil 
Rights Act to enforce the federal regulations, holding that the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) does not create or imply a private 
right of action.70  The court reasoned that regulations promulgated by 
an agency cannot give rise to a private cause of action if the authorizing 
statute does not confer that right. 
Further, even where courts have found a relationship between the 
investigator and research participant, they have often been unable to 
find adequate materiality or causation to support a private right of 
action for informed consent in research.71  In the research context, it 
is particularly difficult to show that individuals would not have 
participated in a research protocol had they known of certain risks.  
Often, participation in a study is an individual’s final option, after she 
has exhausted all of the treatment alternatives.  In Wright v. Fred 
Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, the court did allow the informed 
consent claim to proceed to trial.72  However, the jury found for the 
Hutch and investigators, concluding that the participants had given 
 
 68  Duff Wilson & David Heath, Patients Never Knew They the Full Danger of Trials They 
Staked Their Lives on, SEATTLE TIMES (2001), available at http://seattletimes.com/ 
uninformed_consent/bloodcancer/story1.html.  
 69  Wright v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1286 
(W.D. Wash. 2002). 
 70  Id. (relying on Robertson v. McGee, No. 01CV60, 2002 WL 535045, at *3 (N.D. 
Okla. Jan. 28, 2002); Robinett v. United States, 62 F.3d 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 71  Lori A. Alvino, Who’s Watching the Watchdogs? Responding to the Erosion of Research 
Ethics by Enforcing Promises, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 910 (2003) (“In all cases the injured 
plaintiff would have to prove the basic elements of a negligence cause of action . . . .  
Depending on the situation, injured research subjects could have a great deal of 
difficulty proving any one of these elements.”).   
 72  Wright v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1286 
(W.D. Wash. 2002). 
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their consent and that a reasonably prudent fully informed person in 
their position would have made the choice to participate in the clinical 
trial.73 
In contrast to Wright, Whitlock v. Duke University represents one of 
the few cases where a court has held that the Common Rule established 
the standard of care for an informed consent claim against 
investigators where there was no preexisting medical relationship 
between the researcher and participant.74  The court attempted to 
distinguish research from treatment and imposed a researcher 
standard of care on the investigator.75  The participant, Leonard 
Whitlock, participated in a simulated deep dive experiment to study 
high pressure nervous syndrome, as a result of which he suffered 
permanent organic brain damage.  Among other claims, Whitlock 
alleged that Duke University negligently failed to warn Whitlock of the 
risk of organic brain damage.  Although the court explained that “the 
degree of required disclosure of risks is higher in the nontherapeutic 
context” than in the nonexperimental therapeutic context controlled 
by the state statute at issue, it held that there was no genuine issue of 
fact regarding whether the risk of organic brain damage unique to 
experimental deep diving was a reasonably foreseeable risk.76  It 
therefore granted summary judgment to Duke University on the 
negligence issue and did not reach the issue of whether a private cause 
of action in favor of a research subject arises from the Common Rule.77 
Where courts have found that participants can bring a claim for 
lack of informed consent in the research context, they have primarily 
done so in cases involving particular populations or where (like in 
Whitlock) the investigator has neglected to disclose information about 
his research or economic interests that may affect his professional 
 
 73  Id. 
 74  637 F. Supp. 1463, 1475 (M.D.N.C. 1986).  See also Vodopest v. MacGregor, 913 
P.2d 779 (Wash. 1996) (adopting the Common Rule as the standard of care for 
informed consent claims). 
 75  Whitlock, 637 F. Supp. 1475. 
 76  Id. at 1471.  See also Anna C. Mastroianni, Liability, Regulation and Policy in Surgical 
Innovation: The Cutting Edge of Research and Therapy, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 351, 420 (2006) 
(“[A] higher standard of disclosure would appear to apply to research than to medical 
practice.”). 
 77  Whitlock, 637 F. Supp. at 1475.  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.  
Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 829 F.2d 1340 (4th Cir. 1987).  One commentator argues that 
the court failed to distinguish clinical innovation (a genre of medical practice) from 
research, the latter requires “a scientific protocol toward gaining generalizable 
knowledge.”  Morreim, supra note 4, at 27 (stating that “although the court ostensibly 
distinguishes between medical treatment and research, its decision was based on an 
important confusion” between research and medical innovation in the precedent 
upon which the court relied). 
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judgment.78  Despite courts’ inability or unwillingness to recognize a 
private right of action for informed consent in the research context, the 
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute decision is frequently cited as evidence 
that courts are beginning to recognize the existence of a duty and 
standard of care arising out of the “special relationship” between 
investigators and research participants established by the Common 
Rule.  The Kennedy Krieger Institute, a research institute associated 
with Johns Hopkins, conducted a non-therapeutic research program 
testing the effectiveness of varying degrees of lead paint abatement in 
housing inhabited by young children.79  With funding from the 
Environmental Protection Agency, it studied the blood lead levels 
found in children who lived in remediated, partially remediated, and 
“modern” housing in the Baltimore area.  Thus, the study “required 
certain classes of homes to have only partial lead paint abatement 
modifications performed . . . [and] encouraged, and in at least one of 
the cases . . . required, the landlords to rent the premises to families 
with young children.”80 
The trial court found for the investigators, and the Maryland 
Court of Appeals reversed.81  The Court of Appeals held that the 
Common Rule’s informed consent requirements create a duty of care 
arising out of a “special relationship” between the investigator and 
research participant, a breach of which was actionable under state law.  
The court held that the research consent form specifically created a 
contract and that the consent form was inadequate.82  Thus, the 
protocol lacked fully informed consent as required by the federal 
regulations.  The court stated that the standard for disclosure is 
whether a reasonably prudent fully informed person would have 
decided to participate in the research.  The participant (or his 
surrogate) is entitled to disclosure of all “reasonably foreseeable” risks 
of the research.  The court predicated its decision on the establishment 
of a so-called “special relationship” between the investigator and the 
research participant, which can give rise to duties for both the 
investigator and the research participant or surrogate, even where the 
investigator is not the research subject’s physician (and therefore no 
doctor-patient relationship exists).  Instead, the duty of care arises out 
of the investigator-subject relationship, and because the investigators 
 
 78  See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
 79  Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001). 
 80  Id. at 811–12.  
 81  Id. 
 82  “The very nature of nontherapeutic research on human subjects can, and 
normally will, create special relationships out of which duties arise.”  Id. at 834–35. 
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waited nine months to disclose “hot spots” of high lead exposure to 
parents (after the child’s blood was found to contain elevated levels of 
lead), they breached the duty to disclose complete and accurate 
information. 
The Grimes court makes a particularly concerted effort to find the 
existence of a “special relationship” that gives rise to duties.  However, 
the decision indicates that such a finding may be constrained to 
particularly circumscribed conditions.83  For example, the court was 
willing to find the existence of an investigator-participant relationship 
because the facts in that case involved (1) surrogate consent to 
research, which offered (2) no prospect of direct benefit to the 
research participants (in other words, the research protocol was 
nontherapeutic), but presented (3) more than a minor increase over 
minimal risk to the (4) otherwise healthy participants.84  Thus, a court 
may be more likely to determine that a “special relationship” exists 
where investigators recruit otherwise healthy individuals, “especially 
children whose consent is furnished indirectly, to participate in 
nontherapeutic procedures that are potentially hazardous, dangerous, 
or deleterious to their health.”85  Significantly, no other court has 
found such a “special relationship” between investigators and research 
participants, and it would be presumptuous to assume, based on this 
single court’s narrow holding, a general private right of action for 
participants for failure to disclose the risks and benefits of a research 
protocol.86 
II.  THE EVOLVING RESEARCH MODEL AND THE SHIFTING 
INVESTIGATOR-PARTICIPANT RELATIONSHIP 
The practice of medicine has changed dramatically in the last four 
decades, arguably blurring the line between research and treatment.87  
The doctor-patient relationship is itself transforming, becoming less 
permanent and more impersonal—much like the traditional 
investigator-participant relationship.  For example, patients often rely 
on multiple specialists (for finite amounts of time each) rather than a 
single generalist over the course of their lifetime, thereby contributing 
to less lasting relationships.  This may signal a “knowledge transition” 
in the conventional practice of medicine, where “the growth of 
 
 83  The court makes clear that whether such a relationship exists should be 
determined on a “case by case” basis.  Id. at 858. 
 84  Id. at 846. 
 85  Grimes, 782 A.2d 807, 845–46. 
 86  See Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 30; Alvino, supra note 71, at 910. 
 87  Gold, supra note 19, at 135. 
KOCH (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  5:31 PM 
194 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:173 
medical knowledge caused a shift from a treatment that is provided by 
one (familiar) physician to a treatment provided by several (unknown) 
specialists and sub-specialists.”88  Further, the provision of care 
increasingly involves more advanced technology, signaling a 
“technological transition,” in which “advanced technological 
equipment became an integral and prominent component of medical 
evaluation and treatment.”89  The “structural transition” in the 
conventional practice of medicine is exacerbated by the increasing 
role of insurance companies or hospitals.90  Moreover, the information 
disparity traditionally present in the doctor-patient relationship 
continues to dissipate.  Thus, the doctor-patient relationship is 
becoming more like that of the investigator-patient: more transitory, 
impersonal, and indirect. 
Maintaining the distinction between the duties owed to patients 
and duties owed to research participants may become even less 
sustainable as the distinctions between treatment and research 
continue to diminish.  Research participants are often subject to the 
same procedures and risks as patients (but frequently are not 
presented with the attendant potential benefits of an intervention).  
Further, calls for similar approaches to both of these relationships—
including compensation for injured patients and participants—often 
hinge on the comparable information disequilibrium that exist in 
each.  The Grimes court noted disparate knowledge levels between 
investigators and subjects in the research context, explaining that the 
“special relationship” between investigators and research participants 
“arise because, generally, the investigators are in a better position to 
anticipate, discover, and understand the potential risks to the health 
of their subjects.  Practical inequalities exist between researchers, who 
have superior knowledge, and participants ‘who are often poorly 
placed to protect themselves from risk.’”91 
 
 
 
 
 
 88  Gold, supra note 19, at 135. 
 89  Gold, supra note 19, at 135. 
 90  Gold, supra note 19, at 135.  The author notes a fourth transition in the practice 
of medicine that is less relevant to this analysis, the epidemiological transition, where 
“the overall prevalence and lethality of infectious diseases has been reduced 
significantly while there has been a relative rise in the overall prevalence of chronic 
and degenerative conditions.”  Gold, supra note 19, at 135. 
 91  Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 851 (Md. 2001) (citation 
omitted).   
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The fact that consent to the treatment is left to judicial control, 
while consent to the research is left to statutory and regulatory control, 
may reflect the traditional distinction between treatment and 
research.92  However, at the same time as the physician-patient 
relationship has become less permanent and personal, the typical 
research model has evolved since the most notable court efforts to find 
a duty of care, premised on a special relationship93—thereby making 
the line between treatment and research less well-defined.  In turn, 
courts may be less able to rely on the distinction between treatment 
and research goals as a justification for different standards for recovery 
for nondisclosure of material information.  In fact, there is evidence 
that courts have begun to recognize the artificiality of the distinction 
between treatment and research.94  For example, in 1976—two years 
after the passage of the National Research Act—a federal appeals court 
applying New Mexico law addressed the increasingly unclear line 
between treatment and experimental procedures.95  In Ahern v. Veterans 
Administration, a patient brought a medical malpractice action against 
the Veterans Administration (VA) for negligently administering 
excessive amounts of radiation in the treatment of a cancerous tumor.96  
The chief of surgical services at the VA testified that no medical 
research supported deviating from the standard of care.97  The 
plaintiff’s physician similarly testified that, in his opinion, 
administering the dosage of radiation was “experimental.”98  Focusing 
on the “experimental nature” of the intervention, the court held that, 
“in order for a physician to avoid liability by engaging in drastic or 
experimental treatment, which exceeds the bounds of established 
medical standards, his patient must always be fully informed of the 
 
 92  BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 259. 
 93  Grimes, 782 A.2d 807 . 
 94  However, not all scholars agree that research and treatment are similar enough 
to warrant this possible conflation.  See Ellen Wright Clayton & Amy L. McGuire, The 
Legal Risks of Returning Results of Genomic Research, 14 GENETICS IN MED. 473 (2012).  
Others maintain that the obligations of researchers must be different from those of 
treating physicians.  Coleman, supra note 3, at 403 (recommending reliance on 
fiduciary law as a model for the researcher-subject relationship); Henry S. Richardson 
& Leah Belsky, The Ancillary-Care Responsibilities of Medical Researchers: An Ethical 
Framework for Thinking About the Clinical Care that Researchers Owe Their Subjects, 34 
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 25, 25 (2004) (“Researchers do not owe their subjects the same 
level of care that physicians owe patients, but they owe more than merely what the 
research protocol stipulates.  In keeping with the dynamics of the relationship between 
researcher and subject, they have limited but substantive fiduciary obligations.”). 
 95  Ahern v. Veterans Admin., 537 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1976). 
 96  Id. at 1099. 
 97  Id. 
 98  Id. at 1101. 
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experimental nature of the treatment and of the foreseeable 
consequences of that treatment.”99 
Moreover, the oft-cited case Moore v. Regents of the University of 
California highlights the increasingly blurred line between the 
treatment and research relationships.100  The Supreme Court of 
California held that a patient with hairy cell leukemia had a cause of 
action based on his physician’s failure to disclose his intent to use 
portions of the plaintiff’s spleen in research for which the physician 
hoped to benefit financially.101  The court then remanded the case for 
trial on the grounds that the patient, Moore, had alleged a valid cause 
of action because Golde, Moore’s physician, did not disclose facts 
“material to the patient’s consent.”102  Failure to disclose such interests 
may “give rise to a cause of action for performing medical procedures 
without informed consent or breach of fiduciary duty.”103  Moore’s 
physicians represented that the taking of Moore’s cells was solely or 
primarily for research rather than for therapeutic purposes.  Moore 
alleged that his physician concealed his nontherapeutic interests, 
telling Moore that the takings were required for Moore’s health and 
well-being and denying any commercial or financial interest in the 
cells.104  The court decided that the physician had an obligation to 
disclose the research and economic purposes of the tissue he extracted 
during the splenectomy, which would be material to the patient’s 
decision to undergo treatment.105  The court therefore held that a 
 
 99  Id. at 1102 (emphasis added). 
 100  Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493 (Cal. 1990).  But see 
Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1070 (S.D. 
Fla. 2003) (noting that “since the law regarding a duty of informed consent for 
research subjects is unsettled and fact-specific . . . , the Court finds that in certain 
circumstances a medical researcher does have a duty of informed consent[,]” but 
declining to extend the duty to disclose economic interests where a researcher is not 
in a therapeutic relationship with the patient).  The court in Greenberg found that Moore 
was “clearly distinguishable” because of this lack of clinical dependence between the 
parties.  Id.  Further, although the court in Greenberg noted in dicta that a duty may 
attach at some point in the investigator-participant relationship, the duty of informed 
consent in medical research has not been extended to disclosure of a researcher’s 
economic interests.  Id. 
 101  Moore, 793 P.2d at 493. 
 102  Id. at 484. 
 103  Id. at 483. 
 104  Id. at 481. 
 105  Id. at 484.  Some commentators have described the problematic nature of 
conflating research and treatment in this case, noting that “the medically pointless 
tissue removals could not have been malpractice because they were not medical 
practice at all . . . [because] medical treatment aims ‘to benefit or cure the patient.’”  
Morreim, supra note 4, at 22 (quoting Craft v. Vanderbilt Univ., 18 F. Supp. 2d 786, 
796 (M.D. Tenn. 1998)). 
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physician who used a patient’s surgically removed spleen to establish a 
patented cell line should have disclosed his research and economic 
interests to the patient prior to the intervention.106  This case highlights 
the lack of clarity regarding where treatment ends and research begins 
and is often relied upon to support the argument that the physician-
patient relationship and investigator-participant relationship should 
be treated similarly. 
Indeed, allowing harmed research participants the opportunity to 
recover might be even more necessary in the research context than in 
the treatment setting because of the greater probability of conflicting 
or diverging goals between investigator and research participant.107  In 
fact, in addition to the knowledge gap between investigators and 
participants, this “misalignment of interests” was one of the theories 
upon which the Grimes court based its decision.108 
III.  AN OBLIGATION TO DISCLOSE RESEARCH FINDINGS MAY FURTHER 
TRANSFORM THE INVESTIGATOR-PARTICIPANT RELATIONSHIP 
As technology advances, the discovery of “research findings”109—
incidental or secondary findings (results that arise that are outside the 
purpose of the research protocol110)—or other information that could 
affect the research participant’s health or decision-making will become 
more likely and frequent.  The proliferation of research protocols 
involving genetic and biological samples111 or medical imaging will 
result in a wide range of potential research findings.112  For example, 
the use of whole genome or exome sequencing “by nature produces 
incidental genomic findings, i.e., findings that have potential health or 
reproductive importance discovered in the course of conducting 
research but beyond the aims of the study.”113  In turn, an expectation 
that such research results should be returned to research participants 
may transform the investigator-participant relationship, giving rise to 
 
 106  Id.   
 107  Id. at 16–17; BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 281; see also Pike, supra note 4. 
 108  Stephanie A. Alessi, The Return of Results in Genetic Testing: Who Owes What to 
Whom, When, and Why?, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1697, 1715 (2013). 
 109   Eckstein, Garrett & Berkman, supra note 8, at 190. 
 110  Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: 
Analysis and Recommendations, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 219 (2008). 
 111  Rafael Dal-Ré et al., Managing Incidental Genomic Findings in Clinical Trials: 
Fulfillment of the Principle of Justice, 11 PLOS MED. 1, 1 (2014) (“Increasingly, clinical 
trials to develop new drugs and biologics involve whole genome or exome sequencing 
(WGS/ WES), including for biomarker characterization, for identification of genomic 
risk factors, and for population-based research.”). 
 112  Pike, Rothenberg & Berkman, supra note 54.  
 113  Rafael Dal-Ré et al., supra note 111, at 1. 
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an obligation to disclose research findings.  Eventually, this may open 
the door for a private right of action for failure to disclose the risks of 
a study.114  Thus, the emerging duty of investigators to participants—a 
duty that may not have been as explicitly recognized in the past—may 
signify a new approach to how the law should approach the 
investigator-participant relationship.  This section will explore the 
emerging ethical (and perhaps, legal) obligation to disclose research 
findings and how it will impact the investigator-participant 
relationship. 
Whether there is an ethical duty to disclose the results of research 
to individual participants—whether or not the results are directly 
related to the central research inquiry—has become a central question 
in human subjects research.115  In fact, in the last decade and a half, 
disclosure of research findings has been increasingly called for among 
scholars and research participants.116  This is particularly true in 
genetics research.117  For example, a 2009 survey found that 90 percent 
of 343 genetic researchers agreed that they had a duty to offer subjects 
aggregate research results.118  And a 2013 study concluded that a 
 
 114  The reasoning in this Article is not predicated on the conclusion that there 
currently is a legal duty to return research findings to study participants; I believe that 
an ethical duty to disclose such findings is sufficient to demonstrate an evolving 
relationship between the investigator and the research participant.  However, some 
scholars have begun to evaluate whether a researcher has a legal duty to return 
incidental findings.  Pike, Rothenberg, & Berkman supra note 54, at 798 find: 
Although there is no law or case law directly on point . . . there is a small 
possibility that a failure to appropriately return [incidental findings] 
could result in legal liability under law as it stands today.  Furthermore, 
there is a greater likelihood of legal liability as scholars and researchers 
continue to advocate for an ethical obligation, particularly if returning 
[incidental findings] becomes widespread practice.   
 115  Rosario Isasi et al., Disclosure and Management of Research Findings in Stem Cell 
Research and Banking: Policy Statement, 7 REGEN. MED. 439 (2012); Dal-Ré et al., supra 
note 111. 
 116  Ann H. Partridge & Eric P. Winer, Informing Clinical Trial Participants About Study 
Results, 288 JAMA 363 (2002); Conrad Fernandez, Eric Kodish, & Charles Weijer, 
Informing Study Participants of Research Results: An Ethical Imperative, 25 IRB: ETHICS & 
HUMAN RESEARCH 12 (2003); David I. Shalowitz & Franklin G. Miller, Disclosing 
Individual Results of Clinical Research, 294(6) JAMA 737 (2005).  However, some scholars 
have expressed concern about the increasing expectation that such information be 
returned to research participants.  See Clayton & McGuire, supra note 94, at 473. 
 117  See Robert C. Green et al., ACMG Recommendations for Reporting of Incidental 
Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing, 15 GENET. MED. 565 (2013). 
 118  Fiona Alice Miller et al., What Does “Respect for Persons” Require? Attitudes and 
Reported Practices of Genetics Researchers in Informing Research Participants about Research, 38 
J. MED. ETHICS 48, 48 (2012).  Despite the apparent widespread acknowledgment of a 
duty to return aggregate results, “return of aggregate results is still an uncommon 
practice in the United States.”  Lynn G. Dressler, Disclosure of Research Results from Cancer 
Genomic Studies: State of the Science, 15 CLINICAL CANCER RES. 4270 (2009).  See also 
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majority of researchers believe that research participants should have 
the option to receive at least some incidental genetic research results.119  
The ethical implications of requiring disclosure of research findings 
may be intensified as the discovery of clinically relevant and 
scientifically valid information becomes more frequent and donors 
increasingly express a desire to receive these findings.120 
The transformation in the duty to disclose incidental or secondary 
findings is manifest in the evolution of national bioethics advisory body 
recommendations on the subject.  In 1999, the National Bioethics 
Advisory Commission (NBAC) under President Clinton stated that 
disclosure of individual research participants’ results “represents an 
exceptional circumstance” and recommended return of research 
findings only under narrowly specified conditions.121  As evidence of 
changing perspectives, in December 2013, the Presidential 
Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues released its report, 
which enunciated a series of recommendations for the management 
of incidental and secondary findings in both treatment and research.122  
The Presidential Commission explicitly acknowledged the fact that, in 
certain circumstances, researchers may have an ethical duty to disclose 
and manage incidental and secondary findings.123 
 
Rebecca Dresser, Public Preferences and the Challenge to Genetic Research Policy, 1 J. L. 
BIOSCIENCES 1 (2014). 
 119  See Robert Klitzman et al., Researchers’ Views on Return of Incidental Genomic 
Research Results: Qualitative and Quantitative Findings, 15 GENETICS IN MED. 888, 888 
(2013). 
 120  Juli Murphy et al., Public Expectations for Return of Results from Large-Cohort Genetic 
Research, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 36 (2008); Juli Murphy Bollinger et al., Public Preferences 
Regarding the Return of Individual Genetic Research Results: Findings from a Qualitative Focus 
Group Study, 14 GENETICS IN MED. 451 (2012); Nicole L. Allen et al., Biobank Participants’ 
Preferences for Disclosure of Genetic Research Results: Perspectives from the OurGenes, 
OurHealth, OurCommunity Project, 89 MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS 738 (2014). 
 121  National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC), Research Involving Human 
Biological Materials: Ethical Issues and Policy Guidance (1999), at vi–vii, available at 
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/hbm.pdf. 
 122  PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 6. 
 123  Id. at 79.  See also Clayton & McGuire, supra note 94, at 473 (“There is substantial 
consensus that people should be offered results that could trigger interventions that 
are lifesaving or that could avert serious adverse health outcomes; there is somewhat 
less consensus about whether people should be offered results that may have 
reproductive implications or that could be personally meaningful.”); Catherine Gliwa 
& Benjamin E. Berkman, Do Researchers Have an Obligation to Actively Look for Genetic 
Incidental Findings? 13 AM. J. BIOETHICS 32, 33 (2013) (“[O]pinion seems to be moving 
toward the idea that there is some obligation to offer to disclose a limited set of 
findings.”); Eckstein, Garrett & Berkman, supra note 8, at 190 (“There appears to be 
an emerging (but disputed) view that researchers have some obligation to disclose 
some genetic findings to some research participants.”); Pike, Rothenberg & Berkman, 
supra note 54, at 9 (“By and large, scholars, practitioners, and advisory bodies agree 
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The nature and duration of the relationship between the research 
participant and the investigator may be the most important 
consideration in determining whether investigators owe research 
participants a duty to disclose research findings.124  Noting that 
“researcher-participant relationships . . . vary in depth and duration,” 
the Presidential Commission called for “clear, consistent, and practical 
guidance” for researchers and institutions “about the ethical duties 
owed to research participants with respect to incidental and secondary 
findings.”125 
Notably, arguments for disclosure of research findings are 
premised on the same principle upon which the requirements for 
informed consent rely.126  In particular, the obligation is premised on 
the principle of autonomy: in order to make future autonomous and 
informed health care decisions, the participant has a right to know 
information discovered about him during the course of research.  The 
return of genetic results demonstrates respect for individual autonomy 
and is being increasingly recognized as a “moral imperative.”127  Thus, 
investigators may have an “affirmative duty . . . to truly give individuals 
the informational access that they deserve.”128 
The ethical duty to return research findings has been described 
as potentially giving rise to “a legal obligation to offer findings of likely 
clinical or reproductive significance to research participants.”129  
Although there is no federal statutory requirement for disclosure of 
research results,130 “[s]ome recent case law suggests that a legal trend 
may be emerging toward recognizing an obligation on the part of a 
researcher to provide a research participant with information acquired 
from a study, when that information has clinical implications for the 
participant.”131  Commentators have noted the increasing potential for 
 
that researchers have an ethical obligation to offer to return some [incidental 
findings.]”).  See also Wolf, Paradise & Caga-anan, supra note 30.   
 124  Gaile Renegar et al., Returning Genetic Research Results to Individuals: Points-to-
Consider, 20 BIOETHICS 24 (2006). 
 125  PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 6, at 77. 
 126  See id.  This point will be discussed further in Part IV.A. 
 127  See Misha Angrist, You Never Call, You Never Write: Why the Return of “Omic” Results 
to Research Participants is Both a Good Idea and a Moral Imperative, 8 PER. MED. 651 (2011). 
 128  Alessi, supra note 108, at 1710.   
 129  Wolf, Paradise & Caga-anan, supra note 30, at 367; see also Shalowitz & Miller, 
supra note 116; Vardit Ravitsky & Benjamin S. Wilfond, Disclosing Individual Genetic 
Results to Research Participants, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 8, 9 (2006). 
 130  Federal regulations that govern the conduct of human subjects research, such 
as the Common Rule and FDA rules, provide no guidance on disclosing research 
results. 
 131  Wolf, Paradise & Caga-anan, supra note 30, at 366; Pike, Rothenberg & 
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litigation claiming researcher negligence for failure to disclose to a 
subject an individual research finding of medical significance.132  The 
Grimes decision has been cited as evidence that courts may impose a 
duty on investigators to inform study participants of research results.133  
However, in Ande v. Rock, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals dismissed an 
ordinary negligence claim that alleged that researchers failed to 
disclose an individual research finding indicating that the plaintiffs’ 
child had cystic fibrosis.134  The study focused on whether early 
nutritional intervention would improve outcomes for children 
afflicted with the disease.  Despite the fact that the child was tested for 
the disease at birth as part of the study protocol, the plaintiffs were not 
informed that their daughter had cystic fibrosis.  She was diagnosed 
with the disease at almost two years of age, at which point her mother 
was pregnant with the plaintiffs’ second child, who was also afflicted 
with the disease.135  In upholding the trial court’s dismissal of the 
parents’ negligence claims, the court decided that the parents failed 
to allege any duty-conferring relationship between themselves and the 
researchers.136 
Informed consent law generally requires disclosure of research 
risks that are material and reasonably foreseeable.137  Because 
secondary or incidental findings are discovered in the course of 
research, research participants cannot claim that the information 
would have been material to their initial decision to participate in the 
research protocol.  However, many scholars and policy makers have 
called for disclosure of the possibility of discovering incidental or 
secondary findings in the course of a research protocol at the outset of 
research—i.e., during the informed consent process.138 
 
Berkman, supra note 54.  Wolf, Paradise, and Caga-anan discuss Blaz v. Michael Reese 
Hosp. Found., 74 F. Supp. 2d 803 (N.D. Ill. 1999), in which an investigator had a duty, 
absent a physician-patient relationship, to warn the research participant of the findings 
that he might be at “greater risk of neural tumors in a way that might have permitted 
their earlier detection and removal or other treatment.”  Supra note 30, at 370.  
According to the authors, the case “suggest[s] that researchers indeed have legally 
cognizable duties towards research participants, although the scope of these duties is 
not yet well-defined.  Supra note 30, at 370. 
 132  Gordon, supra note 55, at 226. 
 133  Gordon, supra note 55, at 234. 
 134  647 N.W. 2d 265, 269 (WI Ct. App. 2002). 
 135  Id. at 270. 
 136  Id. at 276. 
 137  See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 138  The Presidential Commission recommended that “[d]uring the informed 
consent process, researchers should describe the types of incidental and secondary 
findings that might arise to ensure that participants are as informed as possible.”  
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 6, at 13. 
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Importantly, however, scholars generally agree that disclosure of 
an incidental finding “does not transform a research relationship into 
a clinical one.”139  Thus, despite the evolving relationship between 
investigators and participants as a result of the emerging obligation to 
disclose (at least the potential for) research findings, that relationship 
should not be treated as identical to the treatment relationship.  As 
both the doctor-patient and investigator-participant relationships 
continue to shift over time in the wake of technological and other 
advances and discoveries, the duties that arise under each will also 
evolve.140 
IV.  A CALL FOR A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR INFORMED CONSENT 
IN RESEARCH, BASED ON THE EVOLVING INVESTIGATOR-PARTICIPANT 
RELATIONSHIP 
Research participants who experience physical or dignitary 
harms141 as a result of lack of informed consent still have little recourse.  
While there is a robust literature focused on the absence of investigator 
liability for failure to provide informed consent based on concerns 
regarding information imbalance, bodily integrity, and autonomy,142 
law and policy makers have yet to reach consensus about how or even 
whether a research participant should have a private right of action for 
failure to disclose the risks of a research protocol. 
Further, the movement to require disclosure of research findings 
may signal a shift in the right of participants to seek remedies directly 
from researchers and research institutions who neglect to 
communicate such information.143  The assertion that an investigator 
is obliged to disclose (or offer the research participant the opportunity 
 
 139  PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 6, at 16.  
In contrast, however, few have expressed concern that requiring return of results could 
“turn the research enterprise into a proxy clinical enterprise.”  Id. at 91 (quoting 
Robert C. Green’s presentation to the Presidential Commission). 
 140  In fact, research involving genetic or other biological samples may signal the 
development of a more tenuous investigator-participant relationship than in the past.  
See Valerie G. Koch, PGTandMe: Social Networking-Based Genetic Testing and the Evolving 
Research Model, 22 HEALTH MATRIX 33 (2012).  Thus, rather than opening the door to 
a private right of action based on a more robust duty of care, the proliferation of 
research involving biological materials may, instead, diminish the duty investigators 
have to their participants. 
 141  Dignitary harms are “caused by conduct that overrides patients’ autonomy, 
treats them as less than human, and denigrates them as human beings.”  Dena S. Davis, 
The Ambiguous Effects of Tort Law on Bioethics: The Case of Doctor-Patient Communications, 
21 J. CLIN. ETHICS 264, 265 (2010).  
 142  See BERG ET AL., supra note 4; Morreim, supra note 4, at 63; Mello, Studdert & 
Brennan, supra note 4, at 40; Jansson, supra note 4, at 235; Pike, supra note 4, at 7. 
 143  See supra Section III. 
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to receive) findings that are secondary to the research protocol is at odds 
with the lack of obligation to disclose the primary risks of the research 
protocol itself.  As the hypotheticals at the outset of this Article 
demonstrate, if society is to impose an affirmative obligation on 
investigators to return findings unrelated to the research protocol, for 
which failure to do so could result in tort liability, it seems incongruous 
that research participants should not be able to recover for failure to 
meet the lesser obligation to disclose the risks of the study in which the 
subject is actually participating. 
In light of the evolving research model, as represented by the 
collection, retention, and testing of biological samples or use of 
medical imaging, the traditional distinction between recovering for 
lack of informed consent in the treatment and research contexts is 
becoming less justifiable. 
A.  Autonomy as the Underlying Principle 
Each duty at issue in the present analysis—(1) the duty of the 
doctor to the patient to provide informed consent, (2) the duty of the 
investigator to the participant to provide informed consent, and (3) 
the duty of the investigator to disclose incidental or secondary findings 
(or the possibility thereof) to participants—is premised on the 
principle of autonomy.144  For purposes of this discussion, autonomy 
encompasses the ability to choose to receive information about oneself 
and to make and carry out informed decisions based on that 
knowledge.145 
 
 144  This Article does not attempt to dissect or examine the autonomy principle in 
significant depth.  For such analysis, see IMMANUEL KANT, ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY (James 
W. Ellington trans., 1983); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rappaport ed., 
1978).  For discussions of the principle of autonomy in the medical context, see KATZ, 
supra note 14; Shultz, supra note 12; Alexander McCall Smith, Beyond Autonomy, 14 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 23 (1997); Roger B. Dworkin, Medical Law and Ethics in 
the Post-Autonomy Age, 68 IND. L. J. 727 (1993). 
 145  It has been argued that the principle of autonomy has two different meanings, 
each of which is invoked in different contexts to serve different purposes.  The first, 
liberal individualism, is “the idea that each person has a right to make his or her own 
decisions about matters that affect that person in important ways and to act to 
effectuate those decisions.”  Roger B. Dworkin, Getting What We Should from Doctors: 
Rethinking Patient Autonomy and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 235, 
238 (2003).  The second, physical essentialism, “is the view that one is entitled to be 
let alone, especially to have one’s body let alone.”  Id.  Similarly, Mark S. Stein and 
Julian Savulescu distinguish between two conceptions of autonomy: the “liberal 
conception” and the “libertarian conception” of autonomy.  Mark S. Stein & Julian 
Savulescu, Welfare versus Autonomy in Human Subjects Research, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 303, 
308 (2011).  These two conceptions do not directly map onto the two categories that 
Dworkin describes, although one could engage in a useful comparison.  Important to 
this analysis, Stein and Savulescu explain, “liberal autonomy will not honor a person’s 
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For one, autonomy is consistently invoked as the operative 
principle for informed consent in the treatment context.  For example, 
Marshall Kapp explains, the “ethical precept [of individual autonomy] 
has been transformed slowly but steadily in the United States into the 
enforceable legal doctrine of informed consent.”146  Peter Shuck asserts 
that “[t]he most fundamental normative argument in favor of 
requiring health care providers to obtain patients’ informed consent 
to medical treatments proceeds from the principle of autonomy—the 
notion that each mature individual has a right to make the basic 
choices that affect her life prospects.”147 
Second, the federal regulations governing human subjects 
research also rely on the autonomy principle in its informed consent 
requirements.148  As research evolves to focus more on human 
biological materials than on physical interventions, harmed research 
participants are less able to rely on the traditional claim for battery.149  
As research shifts to focus on previously collected biological 
 
decision to be a subject in an experiment unless that decision is made with full 
information, under conditions that conduce to full understanding and authentic 
choice.”  In contrast, “[l]ibertarianism respects the actual choices of people, whether 
or not those choices are made with full information,” and thus, “libertarian autonomy 
cannot easily endorse the requirement of informed consent.”  Id. at 309.  Regarding 
this latter definition, scholars have maintained that one’s right to make decisions 
about oneself depends on the relative privacy of the choice, and the most private of 
choices relates to those concerning one’s own body.  Peter H. Shuck, Rethinking 
Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 924 (1994).  However, the first definition is most 
frequently invoked by courts and scholars in the context of informed consent in both 
the treatment (Dworkin, at 245) and research (Stein & Savulescu, supra note 145, at 
308) contexts and in arguments in support of disclosing research findings.  
Compounding the obligation of investigators to participants is the broader notion that 
“investigators have ‘ancillary care’ obligations to their study participants.”  Dal-Ré et 
al., supra note 113, at 2.  Notably, commentators have addressed the foundation of 
ancillary care in the principle of autonomy, based on the relationship between the 
investigator and research participant. 
 146  Marshall B. Kapp, Patient Autonomy in the Age of Consumer-Driven Health Care: 
Informed Consent and Informed Choice, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 91, 91 (2007). 
 147  Shuck, supra note 145, at 924; see also George P. Smith II, The Vagaries of Informed 
Consent, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 109 (2004).  Evelyn Tenebaum states, “[t]he purpose of 
informed consent laws is to ensure that patients receive sufficient information about 
the risks and alternatives of medical procedures to make their own health care 
decisions based on their personal values, preferences, and priorities.” Evelyn 
Tenebaum, Revitalizing Informed Consent and Protecting Patient Autonomy: An Appeal to 
Abandon Objective Causation, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 697 (2012).  
 148  Russell Korobkin, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Nontherapeutic Biomedical 
Research, 54 UCLA L. REV. 605, 610 (2007) (“The common rule’s informed consent 
requirement is designed to supply research subjects with all the information they need 
to perform an autonomous risk-benefit analysis.”).  
 149  See supra Part I.A. 
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specimens,150 donors’ continued status as research participants 
becomes less certain,151 further implicating participants’ autonomy 
interests and privacy rights.152 
Third, supporters of a duty to return research findings often rely 
upon the principles of respect for persons and autonomy, describing 
the participants’ “presumptive entitlement” to information about 
themselves.153  In one study, patients and public groups “emphasized 
having ‘the power’ to choose disclosure or not, and that patients no 
longer accept medical paternalism.”154 
Thus, the autonomy principle upon which calls to disclose 
research findings rely is the same as that upon which informed 
consent—in both the treatment and research contexts—is premised.  
In fact, some scholars have sought to explicitly link informed consent 
at the outset of research to disclosure of research findings in order to 
“ensure that the research process as a whole honors the notion of 
respect for persons upon which human research subjects protections 
are premised.”155  Further, technological advances in genomics may 
advance “a more thoroughgoing respect for persons than was possible 
when current policies governing human subject research were 
developed.”156  Thus, application of the autonomy principle to justify 
return of research results but not to support informed consent to 
research is both incoherent and incongruous.157 
 
 150  Existing policy and current academic literature acknowledges that the federal 
rules and regulations governing informed consent for research with human subjects 
also apply to most research with biospecimens, except in some limited conditions.  
David Wendler, One Time General Consent for Research on Biological Samples, 332(7540) 
BRIT. MED. J. 544 (2006); Marshall B. Kapp, Ethical and Legal Issues in Research Involving 
Human Subjects: Do You Want a Piece of Me?, 59 J. CLIN. PATHOL. 335–39 (2006); Barbara 
J. Evans and Eric M. Meslin, Encouraging Translational Research Through Harmonization 
of FDA and Common Rule Informed Consent Requirements for Research with Banked Specimens, 
27 J. LEG MED. 119 (2006). 
 151  See Clayton & McGuire, supra note 94, at 473. 
 152  David Magnus & Mildred K. Cho, Issues in Oocyte Donation for Stem Cell Research, 
308(5729) SCIENCE 1747 (2005); Geoff Lomax & Steve Peckman, Stem Cell Policy 
Exceptionalism: Proceed with Caution, 8 STEM CELL REV. AND REP. 299 (2011). 
 153  Shalowitz & Miller, supra note 116, at 738; see also Wolf, Paradise & Caga-anan, 
supra note 30, at 367; Dena S. Davis, Opportunistic Testing: The Death of Informed Consent?, 
23 HEALTH MATRIX 35 (2013). 
 154  Anne Townsend et al., Paternalism and the ACMG Recommendations on Genomic 
Incidental Findings: Patients Seen But Not Heard, 15 GENETICS IN MED. 751, 752 (2013). 
 155  Debra J.H. Mathews & Leila Jamal, Revisiting Respect for Persons in Genomic 
Research, 5 GENES 1 (2014). 
 156  Id. at 2. 
 157  See Kapp, supra note 146, at 93 (“It is erroneous, even counterproductive, to 
attempt to pick and choose among different categories of health care choices and then 
apply the autonomy principle selectively.”).  
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Regardless of whether informed consent serves the interest of 
patient or participant autonomy in actuality, informed consent in the 
research context relies on the same operative theoretical principles of 
autonomy and respect for persons as informed consent in the 
treatment context.158  Sharing these underlying principles further 
supports treating the duties of both physicians and investigators 
similarly.  This Article proposes that, based on the consistently-applied 
principle of not treating persons as mere means to an end, research 
participants should have access to a private right of action against 
investigators who fail to provide informed consent, similar to the access 
patients have to a private right of action against doctors who do the 
same.  The establishment of a method to compensate research 
participants for injuries sustained as a result of participating in a study 
is the rational, just approach.159 
B.  The Standard of Care for a Private Right of Action for Informed 
Consent in Research 
However, the standard of care for such a private right of action 
for informed consent in research should not be identical to the 
standard for informed consent in treatment.  Although research 
participants should have a right to recover for failures of informed 
consent, courts should consider applying a new (or at least modified) 
approach—one other than medical malpractice or ordinary 
 
 158  An analysis of the advisability of continuing to rely on “autonomy rhetoric” in 
the medical context is beyond the scope of this Article.  For a discussion of the concept 
of autonomy, see Dworkin, supra note 145, at 247 and Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient 
& Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and Obligations in the Physician-Patient 
Relationship, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 47 (1994). 
 159  Some have called for the establishment of a “distinct dignitary tort” for “serious 
deficiencies of informed consent,” in both medical care and research.  Morreim, supra 
note 4, at 73–74 (citing Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human 
Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 691 (1975); 
Joan Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost Containment, 
85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 270–72 (1999); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO WASH. L REV. 
136, 150–51 (1992); Shultz, supra note 12, at 291–92; Alan Meisel, A ‘Dignitary Tort’ as 
a Bridge Between the Idea of Informed Consent and the Law of Informed Consent, 16 L., MED. 
HEALTH CARE 210, 210–18 (1988); Grant H. Morris, supra note 20, at 322; Alan 
Weisbard, Informed Consent: The Law’s Uneasy Compromise with Ethical Theory, 65 NEB. L. 
REV. 749, 763 (1986).  In Medical Research Litigation and Malpractice Tort Doctrines: Courts 
on a Learning Curve, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 74 (2003), E. Haavi Morreim notes: 
[B]ecause standard informed consent doctrine usually limits recovery to 
cases featuring a physical or other separate injury, it can fail to honor 
human autonomy in cases where someone’s right to choose has been 
abused without demonstrable physical damage.  If this is a problem in 
ordinary medicine, it is even more so in the research setting. 
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negligence—in its analysis.160  For one, simple negligence claims are 
inappropriate for remedying harms that occur in the research 
context.161  The Ande v. Rock opinion is representative of this concern.162  
By finding that no special relationship existed between the 
investigators and the participant’s family, the court held that the 
researchers owed no duties to the plaintiffs beyond those required 
under ordinary negligence.163  The case demonstrates the problems 
that arise when courts find research to be “nothing more than ordinary 
conduct”—and the need to recognize that “[r]esearchers have many 
duties that go well beyond those of ordinary citizens in the affairs of 
daily life.”164 
Second, although it may be argued that justice requires that 
research subjects be treated like patients, with the attendant rights and 
remedies, it does not necessarily follow that the same standards of care 
be applied to participants in clinical trials as to patients in the clinical 
setting.165  Requiring a different—and probably heightened166—
standard for disclosure of the risks of research (compared to 
treatment) is necessary for a number of reasons.  Despite the 
similarities between treatment and research, approaching the two as 
equivalents would be “generous but flawed.”167  The simplest reason for 
 
 160  Morreim, supra note 4, at 32.  For example, the author recommends that 
“conduct that is distinctive to research should be litigated under a research-focused 
standard of care based on defects in the protocol, failures to adhere to the protocol, 
breaches of research-specific informed consent, and the like.”  Id. at 41; see also 
Coleman, supra note 3, at 403. 
 161  Importantly, because there are significant differences between treatment and 
research, there are also “major differences among research injuries, medical 
malpractice, and ordinary negligence.”  Morreim, supra note 4, at 30.  The author 
notes: 
Across this spectrum, the message is not that research injuries are 
somehow worse (or better) than medical malpractice, or that we need 
to augment (or diminish) the available causes of action against research 
errors.  The message is simply that research is different, that courts need 
to be more knowledgeable and to think more clearly if they are to build 
an adequate foundation by which to guide conduct in this increasingly 
important realm.  
 Id. at 32. 
 162  647 N.W. 2d 265 (WI Ct. App. 2002).  See supra Section III. 
 163  647 N.W. 2d 265 (WI Ct. App. 2002).  
 164  Morreim, supra note 4, at 30. 
 165  Dal-Ré et al., supra note 113; Kathleen Cranley Glass & Duff Waring, The 
Physician/Investigator’s Obligation to Patients Participating in Research: The Case of Placebo 
Controlled Trials, 33 J. L. MED & ETHICS 575 (2005). 
 166  Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and 
Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J. L. & MED. 361, 379 (2002); Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 829 
F.2d 1340 (4th Cir. 1987). 
 167  Richardson & Belsky, supra note 94, at 26.  
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a distinction between the standards of care is that researchers are not 
always physicians.168  Where the investigator is a physician, conflating 
the “roles of personal physician and clinical researcher . . . threatens 
to exacerbate the therapeutic misconception.”169  More fundamentally 
(and as discussed above), the primary goals of treatment and research 
are distinct: the former is focused on the care and health of the 
individual patient, while the latter aims to produce generalizable 
knowledge.170  Moreover, in contrast to the decision to pursue 
therapeutic treatment (which generally is based on a desire to 
maintain or improve one’s own health or well-being), the decision to 
participate in a research protocol is “highly individual”171 and may be 
based on a variety or combination of reasons.172 
Historically, when determining the standard for disclosure in the 
treatment context, courts considered what a reasonable physician would 
have disclosed under the circumstances.173  However, this “professional 
standard” of informed consent has been replaced in at least half of the 
states by the reasonable patient standard enunciated in Canterbury v. 
Spence174 because of the former’s “excessive paternalism and the 
effective immunity that it granted to defendants.”175  In contrast to tort 
 
 168  Richardson & Belsky, supra note 94, at 26. 
 169  Richardson & Belsky, supra note 94, at 26.  For a full explanation and analysis 
of the therapeutic misconception, see Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Therapeutic 
Misconception in Clinical Research: Frequency and Risk Factors, 26 IRB: ETHICS & HUMAN 
RESEARCH 1 (2004); Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Corrections and Clarifications, 26 IRB: 
ETHICS & HUMAN RESEARCH 18 (2004). 
 170  Coleman, supra note 3; BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 281; Gordon, supra note 55. 
 171  E. Haavi Morreim, Litigation in Clinical Research: Malpractice Doctrines Versus 
Research Realities, 32 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 474, 479 (2004) (explaining why the two 
prevailing standards of care—the physician-based standard and the reasonable-patient 
standard—for physicians’ duty of disclosure would be inappropriate in the research 
context).  
 172  Id. (“People can have a wide variety of reasons for entering research, from 
altruism to financial gain to a desperate, last-ditch hope for cure.”). 
 173  See Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and 
Experimental Therapy, supra note 166, at 367 (citing Craig v. Borcicky, 557 So. 2d 1253, 
1258 (Ala. 1990); Fuller v. Starnes, 597 S.W.2d 88, 89-90 (Ark. 1980); Shabinaw v. 
Brown, 963 P.2d 1184, 1188–94 (Idaho 1998); Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 
101, 103–04 (Ind. 1992); Ziegert v. South Chicago Community Hosp., 425 N.E.2d 450, 
458–59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1128–31 (Me. 
1980); Paul v. Lee, 568 N.W.2d 510, 514–16 (Mich. 1997); Robinson v. Bleicher, 559 
N.W.2d 473, 478 (Neb. 1997); Hook v. Rothstein, 316 S.E.2d 690, 695–98 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 1984);Weber v. McCoy, 950 P.2d 548, 552 (Wyo. 1997)). 
 174  Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The 
Case for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J. L. & MED. 429, 430 (2006). 
 175  See, e.g., Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard 
and Experimental Therapy, supra note 166, at 367 (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 
772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9–11 (Cal. 1972); Largey v. Rothman, 
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liability for failure to provide informed consent in the treatment 
context—in which jurisdictions are split on the standard for what 
information qualifies as material information for disclosure—tort 
liability for failure to provide informed consent in the research context 
should require the establishment of a particular and carefully crafted 
standard of disclosure.  Between these two standards, the reasonable 
patient standard is likely a more appropriate approximation or model 
of the standard of informed consent for research (in other words, a 
reasonable participant standard). 
In determining what this reasonable participant standard should 
look like, one can look to (1) the standards set forth under federal 
regulations and (2) those historically relied upon in the doctor-patient 
relationship context.  Further, the disclosure standard in research 
could include both an objective and a “subjective element in deference 
to individuals’ varying needs for personally important information, as 
by inviting prospective enrollees to ask questions.”176 
Thus, an appropriate baseline standard for disclosure of the risks 
of research to participants is most likely one commensurate with the 
disclosure requirements under the federal rules,177 which “require an 
array of facts to be disclosed, such as the purposes, duration and 
procedures of the research; any reasonably foreseeable risks or 
discomforts; potential benefits to the enrollee or to others; available 
alternatives to the research trial; and other specified information.”178  
However, the current regulatory requirements for disclosure in 
research may be insufficient to truly protect individuals who are 
harmed as a result of investigators providing inadequate informed 
consent.  Courts should beware that the legal “floor” for acceptable 
behavior may become the ethical standard for disclosure in research, 
thereby undercutting participants’ rights to autonomy and respect.179  
Disclosure standards should be crafted to address the significant and 
distinct dignitary harms that can occur as a result of failure to disclose 
 
540 A.2d 504, 508–09 (N.J. 1988)). 
 176  Morreim, supra note 171, at 479. 
 177  See Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in 
Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147, 2152 (2000); see also Richard Ausness, The Case for 
a “Strong” Regulatory Compliance Defense, 55 MD. L. REV. 1210, 1253–54 (1996); Jansson, 
supra note 4, at 245; Mastroianni, supra note 76, at 420 (referring to the 
“comprehensiveness and specificity of the regulatory requirements for informed 
consent”). 
 178  Morreim, supra note 4, at 66.  See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, 782 A.2d 
807, 849 (Md. 2001) (emphasizing federal regulations as a source of informed consent 
duties); Daum v. SpineCare Med. Group, Inc., 52 Cal. App. 4th 1285 (1997) (deriving 
the standard of care for informed consent from the federal regulations). 
 179  Davis, supra note 141, at 270. 
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the risks of a research protocol.180 
C.   Some Final Thoughts and Caveats 
This Article would be deficient if it failed to address the argument 
that the establishment of a private right of action for failure to provide 
informed consent in the research context could negatively impact the 
research enterprise as a whole.181  Commentators have recognized that 
requiring disclosure of research results to participants could give rise 
to increased investigator liability.182  Despite its ability to compensate 
injured research participants, allowing subjects a private right of action 
“has potentially undesirable ramifications for research oversight 
because it is likely to drive IRBs toward a more legalistic, mechanistic 
approach to ethical review that does not further the interests of human 
subjects or scientific progress.”183  Thus, the “threat of tort liability 
could paralyze IRBs and could have a significant chilling effect on 
clinical research.”184 
 
 180  It has also been suggested that there is (or will be) an identifiable and distinct 
standard of care for return of research findings.  For example, some have argued that 
it would be appropriate “to apply a standard-of-care list of genes for which to actively 
seek pathogenic variants in clinical research,” (Dal-Ré et al., supra note 113) equivalent 
to the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics’s (ACMG) 
recommendations for management of incidental genomic findings obtained in 
clinical practice.  Robert C. Green et al., supra note 117, at 565.  The recommendations 
proposed that clinical genome sequencing laboratories actively seek and report 
pathogenic variants for 56 genes for 24 conditions for all patients, regardless of 
patients’ age or expressed desire to receive the information.  Id. at 570–71.  Although 
the ACMG’s recommendations are controversial (See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf, George J. 
Annas & Sherman Elias, Patient Autonomy and Incidental Findings in Clinical Genomics, 
340 SCIENCE 1049 (2013); Neil A. Holtzman, ACMG Recommendations on Incidental 
Findings are Flawed Scientifically and Ethically, 15 GENETICS IN MED. 750 (2013); Lainie 
Friedman Ross, Mark A. Rothstein & Ellen Wright Clayton, Mandatory Extended Searches 
in All Genome Sequencing: “Incidental Findings,” Patient Autonomy, and Shared Decision 
Making, 310 JAMA 367 (2013))—in particular because they arguably subvert the 
principles of autonomy and informed consent by calling for mandatory screening and 
reporting of gene variants to clinicians and patients (See Robert Klitzman, Paul S. 
Appelbaum & Wendy Chung, Return of Secondary Genomic Findings vs. Patient Autonomy: 
Implications for Medical Care, 310 JAMA 369 (2013); Anne Townsend et al., supra note 
154, at 1–2))—many believe that “it is reasonable to assume that a standard of care will 
emerge for returning incidental genomic findings to patients receiving WGS/WES in 
clinical contexts.”  Dal-Ré et al., supra note 113, at 2. 
 181  See Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1334 (7th Cir. 1992) (“If 
experimental procedures are subject to hindsight evaluation by juries, so that failed 
experiments threaten to impose enormous tort liability on the experimenter, there 
will be fewer experimental treatments, and patients will suffer.”).  
 182  Clayton & McGuire, supra note 94, at 474.  
 183  Mello, Studdert & Brennan, supra note 4, at 40.  
 184  See Barbara A. Noah, Bioethical Malpractice: Risk and Responsibility in Human 
Research, 7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 175, 213 (2004) (citing Richard A. 
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On the other hand, some maintain that offering the return of 
findings to research participants may increase public trust in the 
research enterprise or even increase general awareness of research 
protocols, thereby leading to more, rather than less, research 
participation.185  Moreover, the threat of liability may not have the 
chilling effect on research that some fear, because the risk of loss of 
funding or suspension of research is already sufficiently threatening.186 
Despite these arguments, whether increased liability would lead 
to a significant decrease in useful and important research has not been 
reliably determined.  Even if allowing a private right of action for lack 
of informed consent in the research context did disincentivize certain 
research, this may be an acceptable trade-off for ensuring that research 
participants are treated with the respect they are increasingly coming 
to expect and have always deserved.187  Imposing liability for failure to 
provide informed consent in the research context would serve the dual 
purpose of deterring bad behavior by researchers and research 
institutions and compensating research participants for the physical 
and dignitary harms suffered as a result of such failure.  Further, it sets 
a standard for disclosure that reflects the rights of research participants 
and the evolving expectation for shared decision-making in informed 
consent.  Thus, courts and legislatures188 should pay special attention 
 
Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 
1847 (1996)); see also Richard A. Epstein, Legal Liability for Medical Innovation, 8 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1139, 1156 (1987).  
 185  Fiona Alice Miller et al., supra note 118, at 48.  See also Shalowitz & Miller, supra 
note 116, at 740. 
 186  For example, within a two-year period in the early 2000s, the FDA and OHRP 
“temporarily shut down research programs in at least seven institutions while they 
remediated a host of compliance problems.”  Barbara A. Noah, supra note 184, at 206.  
See, e.g., Gina Kolata, Johns Hopkins Death Brings Halt to U.S.-Financed Human Studies, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2001, at A1 (reporting on the suspension of federal research 
funding to Johns Hopkins due to fact that investigators missed published 
research reporting serious side effects associated with the investigational compound, 
and that the university had received 310 million dollars–more federal research funding 
than any other university). 
 187  For a consideration of the balancing between research innovation and the right 
of informed consent, see Maureen S. Dorney, Moore v. the Regents of the University 
of California: Balancing the Need for Biotechnology Innovation Against the Right of Informed 
Consent, 5 HIGH TECH. L. J. 333 (1990). 
 188  In lieu of developing a private right of action through the courts, state 
legislatures could establish a statutory tort.  Although the most efficacious approach 
to establishing a private right of action for research—be it statutorily or judicially—is 
outside the scope of this Article, it is interesting to note that the court in Wright v. Fred 
Hutchinson Cancer Research Center expressly noted that Congress had “contemplated, 
but ultimately rejected, a statutory mechanism for the compensation of individuals and 
their families for injuries resulting from their participation in human subjects 
research.”  Wright, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1286, at 1290 n.1 (citing S. Rep. No. 93-381, at 90 
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to balancing the rights of research participants with the interests of 
furthering valuable research, in order to avoid allowing informed 
consent to become a protector against liability rather than a protector 
of prospective participants’ rights and welfare.  In other words, the 
standard for disclosure must ensure that the informed consent process 
protects participants of research, rather than investigators and 
research institutions against potential liability. 
In contemplating tort liability for informed consent in the 
research context, we would be well served to consider the greater issue 
of compensation for research-related harms.  Although such analysis is 
beyond the scope of this Article (as is the current regime for tort 
liability for research-related harms generally), it is important to note 
the continuing and polarizing debate surrounding this issue, because 
adopting a national compensation system for all harms that arise as a 
result of participating in research may obviate the need for a private 
right of action for informed consent in the research context.  
Currently, the United States does not require compensation for 
research related injuries for research participants.189  Nor is there any 
indication that the federal government will implement such a system 
in the foreseeable future.  In 2011, the Presidential Commission for 
the Study of Bioethical Issues, like other commissions and advisory 
bodies before it, called for the federal government to study the issue 
of research-related injuries to determine if there is a need for a 
national system of compensation or treatment for research-related 
injuries.190  However, the United States has conspicuously refused to 
 
(1973)).  Moreover, recently proposed revisions by the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) and the Office of Science and Technology Policy are intended 
to clarify the extent and scope of the Common Rule.  Human Subjects Research 
Projections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, 
Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44512 (2011).  The Advanced 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) “raises the possibility that in the future 
contributors will be asked for consent to research on data and samples collected in 
clinical care, and thus could be asked at that point if they wish to be recontacted in 
the future about findings of potential clinical importance.”  Wolf et al., Managing 
Incidental Findings, supra note 110, at 372.  However, it makes no mention of providing 
research participants who are harmed due to insufficient informed consent the 
opportunity to recover from investigators who violate the requirements of the 
Common Rule. 
 189  According to one study, only sixteen percent of academic medical centers in 
the United States make it a policy to pay for the care of injured subjects.  Renuka 
Munshi & Urmila Thatte, Compensation for Research Related Injury, 4 PERSPECTIVES IN 
CLIN. RESEARCH 61, 66 (2013).   
 190  PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, Moral Science: 
Protecting Participants in Human Subjects Research (2011), at 8, available at 
http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/Moral%20Science%20June%202012.pdf.  
The Commission identified the fact that “previous presidentially appointed bioethics 
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sign on to the Declaration of Helsinki—a set of ethical principles 
regarding human subjects research developed for the medical 
community—since before the turn of the century.  The seventh edition 
of the Declaration of Helsinki, adopted by the World Medical 
Association in 2013, added a new general principle: that 
“[a]ppropriate compensation and treatment for subjects who are 
harmed as a result of participating in research must be ensured.”191  
Thus, until the United States adopts a compensation system for harms 
arising as a result of research participation, a private right of action for 
informed consent is necessary, premised on the evolving relationship 
between the investigator and research participant. 
 
 
commissions and other duly appointed advisory bodies have made similar 
recommendations regarding compensation or treatment for research-related injuries; 
yet no clear response by the federal government has been issued.”  Id. at 70. 
 191  WMA Declaration of Helsinki – Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving 
Human Subjects, available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/ 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2014).  As a general principle, the Declaration states, “[w]hile the 
primary purpose of medical research is to generate new knowledge, this goal can never 
take precedence over the rights and interests of individual research subjects.”  Id.  
